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Abstract: Transportation utility fees are a transportation đnancing mechanism in which the network is treated as a utility and properties
are charged fees in proportion to their network use, rather than according to their monetary value as in property taxation. ăis mechanism
connects the costs of maintaining the infrastructure more directly to the beneđts received frommobility and access to the system. ăe fees are
based on the number of trips generated and vary with land use. ăis paper evaluates transportation utility fees as an alternative funding source
in terms of eﬃciency, equity, revenue adequacy and political and administrative feasibility. ăe experiences of cities currently using utility fees
for transportation are discussed. Calculations are included to determine the fee levels necessary for transportation maintenance budget needs
in three sample cities and a county in the Minneapolis-St. Paul (USA) metropolitan area. Proposed fees for each property type are compared
to current property tax contributions toward transportation. ăe regressive eﬀects of the fees and the eﬀect of adjusting for the length of trips
generated are also quantiđed.
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1 Introduction
Recent economic conditions have called into question the sus-
tainability of current transportation funding sources for local
governments. Contributions from state funds generated by
taxes on vehicle sales and fuel consumption can be expected to
decrease as vehicles becomemore fuel eﬃcient and last longer.
Declining property values reduce the revenue available from
property taxes, and rate increases remain unpopular. In light
of these trends, transportation utility fees have generated in-
creased interest as an alternative fundingmechanism. ăe dis-
tribution of property taxes is based on property value, which is
not always a good indication of the burden a property places
on the transportation system. Because vehicle fuel economy
varies widely, the correlation between fuel consumption and
road use is also not direct. Transportation utility fees are as-
sessed to properties based on the number of trips they gen-
erate, providing a more direct connection between demand
for transportation facilities and the costs of constructing and
maintaining them.
ăis paper discusses the development of transportation
utility fees and evaluates their viability as an alternative fund-
ing source. ăe transportation utility fee concept and its un-
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derlying rationale are explained, and the experiences of several
locations in the United States where transportaion utility fees
have been implemented are discussed. Criteria for evaluation
follow, including the potential and observed eﬀects of the fees
on economic eﬃciency, equity, revenue adequacy and sustain-
ability, and political and administrative feasibility issues the
fees present. An analysis was conducted to determine the nec-
essary fee level to fund budgeted transportation needs in three
sample cities and a county in theMinneapolis-St. Paul (USA)
Metropolitan Area (the “Twin Cities”). A description of the
data and methodology used and a discussion of the results are
presented.
2 Concept and rationale
ăereasoning behind transportation utility fees holds that the
transportation system functions as a public utility compara-
ble to municipal water and sewer systems. ăose utilities are
funded by charging users based on how much they use the
systems, and transportation funding can be approached in a
similar way. Properties that cause more traﬃc by the nature
of their use are responsible for a greater portion of the wear
and tear on transportation infrastructure, and might reason-
ably be expected to make larger contributions toward mainte-
nance expenses. ăe fees can be used to đnance construction
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or maintenance projects for any transportation mode, but are
most commonly applied to roads and used to fund preventive
maintenance of existing facilities rather than capital projects.
In many instances, the establishment of a transportation
utility fee is motivated by a revenue shortfall and a backlog
of road maintenance projects. Because they are not taxes, fees
may be adopted without a public referendum in many cases,
though this depends on the city and state in question. ăe
visible connection between the fee and its purpose can also
make it more acceptable to the public and easier to levy than
a new tax. However, to be considered a fee and not a tax, a
đrm relationship between costs and beneđts must be estab-
lished. ăe Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts estab-
lished three standards that distinguish fees from taxes: 1. they
are assessed in exchange for a particular beneđt; 2. they are
avoidable by opting not to use the service; and 3. they exist
not to raise revenue but to compensate the government for
the costs of providing the service (Emerson College v. City of
Boston 1984). A similar common standard known as the “ra-
tional nexus test” includes the following criteria: 1. the service
needs must be directly attributable to those bearing the cost;
2. the costsmust be allocated proportionally to beneđts; 3. the
facilities fundedmust be part of a comprehensive plan; the fee
must account for taxes paid toward transportation so property
owners are not double-billed; and 4. the fee revenues must be
used for their intended purpose in a timely manner (Altshuler
et al. 1993). Variation in these standards among states has led
to a checkeredhistory for the fees in the courts, andwhether to
uphold them as payments for services rendered or strike them
down as illegal taxes can become a semantic argument.
3 Extent of use
Transportation utility fees have been used in several states
since the mechanism was đrst created by ordinance in Fort
Collins, Colorado in 1984. ăey have become most popu-
lar in Oregon, where the city of La Grande was the đrst to
adopt them in 1985. ăe extent of adoption depends on the
legality of the fees, which varies by state and by the wording of
the particular fee in question. ăe Fort Collins fee was chal-
lenged by residents and discontinued by the city. ăe fee in
Pocatello, Idahomet a similar fate in 1986, but litigation con-
tinued in both cases until reaching the state supreme courts.
ăe Idaho Supreme Court ruled the Pocatello fee unconsti-
tutional (Brewster v. City of Pocatello 1988), while the Col-
orado Supreme Court ruled the Fort Collins fee to be valid
with the removal of a clause directing excess collections into
the general fund (Bloom v. City of Fort Collins 1990). ăe
đrst such fee in Oregon was never challenged, encouraging
more city governments in that state to consider transportation
utility fees a viable option. ăe concept then spread to Texas,
where Beaumont introduced a fee that has gone unchallenged,
and to Florida, where the Port Orange fee drew opposition
and was overturned (State of Florida v. ăe City of Port Or-
ange, Florida 1994). ăese and other locations using the fees
are displayed in Table 1.
ăemost commonbasis for a transportation utility fee is an
estimated number of trip ends attributable to each property
type using the procedures found in the Trip Generationman-
ual published by the Institute of Transportation Engineers
(2003). Residential trip rates are given per unit and commer-
cial rates per gross Ĕoor area and per employee. Jurisdictions
may instead use Ĕat or per-unit fees that vary only by property
type, or fees based on land area, Ĕoor area or frontage. Because
all of these are estimates, rather thanmeasurements of exact us-
age for individual properties aswithwater or sewer service, the
connection between cost and service is less solid than for other
utilities. ăe methods presented in Trip Generation are more
likely to withstand legal scrutiny than estimates based on lot
size, but as Shoup (2003) discusses, they are hardly ideal. ăey
are meant to apply nationally, but some of the rates given are
based on very small sample sizes and show little correlation. If
they are used as the basis for utility fees, the accuracy of the
estimated rates might be improved by adjusting based on local
traﬃc counts.
4 Evaluation
ăe proposed fees should be evaluated in themselves and also
against the existing transportation funding source in the juris-
diction, which is usually the property tax. A framework of sev-
eral criteria is used here, similar to that developed byMikesell
(2003). Economic eﬃciency considers the eﬀect on resource al-
location in the community. Equity includes evaluation of fair-
ness based on beneđts received and ability to pay. Revenue ad-
equacy and sustainability concerns the stability of the base and
the revenue potential at a socially acceptable fee level. Political
and administrative feasibility includes public acceptance and
complexity of the collection eﬀort. All criteria are important,
but revenue levels and administration issues might be given
more weight if fee collection and expenditure for transporta-
tion is to be completely separated from general revenue.
4.1 Economic eﬃciency
Funding transportation infrastructure based on user beneđts
would redistribute costs. With the property tax status quo,
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Table 1: Selected U.S. cities using transportation utility fees.
State City Year Adopted Outcome Basis
CO Fort Collins 1984 Discontinued 1987 Front footage
Validated 1990 Trip generation
CO Loveland 2001 In use Flat fee per unit per acre
FL Port Orange 1992 Invalidated 1994 Flat fee
ID Pocatello 1986 Discontinued 1986 Trip generation
Invalidated 1999
OR Ashland 1989 In use Flat fee per unit
OR Bay City 2003 In use Determined by council
OR Corvallis 2005 In use Trip generation
OR Eagle Point 1990 In use Flat fee per unit
Gross Ĕoor area
OR Grants Pass 2001 In use Flat fee per unit
Trip generation
Gross Ĕoor area
OR Hillsboro 2008 Eﬀective 2009 Flat fee per unit
Trip generation
OR Hubbard 2001 In use Flat fee per unit
Trip generation
OR La Grande 1985 In use Flat fee
OR Lake Oswego 2003 In use Flat fee
Trip generation
Gross Ĕoor area
OR Medford 1991 In use Trip generation
OR Milwaukie 2006 In use Trip generation
OR North Plains 2003 In use Trip generation
OR Oregon City 2008 In use Trip generation
OR Philomath 2003 In use Trip generation
Gross Ĕoor area
OR Phoenix 1994 In use Flat fee per unit
Trip generation
OR Talent 2000 In use Trip generation
OR Tigard 2003 In use Flat fee per unit
per parking space
OR Tualatin 1990 In use Trip generation
OR Wilsonville 1997 In use Flat fee per unit
Trip generation
Gross Ĕoor area
TX Austin 1990 In use Trip generation
WA Soap Lake 1992 Invalidated 1995 Flat fee
WI Oconomowoc 2005 Abandoned 2005 Flat fee per unit
Trip generation
Gross Ĕoor area
Source:Carlson et al. (2007), League of Oregon Cities (2008), Hillsboro and Oregon City
municipal codes.
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most residential properties paymore of the costs of transporta-
tion infrastructure than their share of trips justiđes, and most
commercial properties pay less. Additionally, many signif-
icant trip generators such as churches, stadiums and public
oﬃces are tax-exempt and contribute nothing toward trans-
portation facility upkeep. With a transportation utility fee,
the contributions of each type of property directly reĔect use
of the system, and newmoney would accrue from institutions
and the oﬃces of other levels of government.
Whom to charge can be diﬃcult to determine for non-
owner-occupied properties. If owners are charged rather than
tenants, any price signal will not directly reach those who
would act on it. ăough the property tax contributions of ab-
sentee landlordswould be lost, charging the fee to the operator
of a business would create a closer connection to trip genera-
tion than charging the landowner. However, this could com-
plicate administration if tenant information is less complete
and current than ownership information. A larger portion of
the cost of transportation might be paid by nonresidents with
a utility fee than with a tax, as the commercial share would
increase and would likely be passed on to customers.
A fee based on metered usage, as applied to other utilities,
might inĔuence user behavior; however, this is less likely when
the fee is based on predicted rather than actual use and when
billing is not immediate. In this respect, transportation utility
fees could be called non-distortionary, since residents cannot
decrease the amount of their fees by making fewer trips. ăis
characteristic has the potential to create legal issues in states
where the deđnition of a fee requires that it be avoidable by
non-users.
4.2 Equity
Autility fee based on trip generationwould adhere to the ben-
eđt principle of taxation very well if accurate trip generation
calculations were possible. Even using estimates, the costs of
road maintenance billed as a utility fee coincide much more
closely with road use than does the property tax. ăe con-
nection can be improved if trip length and the weights of the
vehicles used are reĔected in the fee schedule. However, the
correlation between the size of the transportation utility fee
charged to a property and the ability of the property owner to
pay will be weaker than in the case of the property tax. ăe
number of trips generated by residences is the same in areas
with low and high average incomes, and the đnancial condi-
tion of a business may not be reĔected in the number of cus-
tomers or deliveries it attracts. ăe ability-to-pay criterion is
less applicable to a fee than to a tax, because fees recover the
cost of services used by a particular property rather than by the
community. Because the purpose of a fee is to recover speciđc
costs rather than to raise general revenue, the beneđt principle
should be given greater weight.
ăe fairness of a speciđc fee is also aﬀected by its basis. For
example, a fee based solely on land area would place an undue
burden on parks and other large parcels that are not used in-
tensively. A fee based on frontagewould do likewise, to a lesser
extent. ăe inclusion of parcels exempt from property taxa-
tion would cause residential properties to contribute a smaller
proportion of the total expense. An equity issue that arises
from the procedures described in Trip Generation is that the
number of units in a multi-family residential development is
not the best proxy for the number of residents or, by exten-
sion, the number of trips. A solution proposed forMilwaukee
byCarlson et al. (2007) is to apportion the residential share by
number of bedrooms rather than by number of units. Courts
have held that exact calculations are not required as long as
the fee schedule is not arbitrary (Ewing 1993). Because trip
generation đgures are estimates rather than observations, the
same methodology should be used for all types of property to
achieve a uniform level of accuracy.
Several other measures have been taken in various cities to
make transportation utility fees more acceptable to owners of
certain types of property. One common consideration is to
count “pass-by” trips with lesser weight for businesses such as
gas stations and convenience stores that attract traﬃc already
making trips between two other destinations. With no ad-
justment, such trips cause an unfairly high charge since they
were not really generated by the business. Some cities have ad-
dressed this by setting a maximumnumber of trips that can be
charged to a property. A similar adjustment can be made for
mixed-use developments that internalize some trips. ăe or-
dinance in Port Orange, Florida included both adjustments,
and Austin, Texas waives the fee for property owners who do
not own a car (Ewing 1993). Another option is to assess truck
trips at a higher rate than car trips, since heavier vehicles cause
more damage to roads. Hillsboro, Oregon considered this but
opted against it, concluding that most heavy vehicle traﬃc
within the city uses arterials rather than local streets (Angelo
Planning Group 2008). Neighboring Wilsonville, however,
does account for vehicle weight because of a greater presence
of warehouses and distribution centers in that city. Some ex-
amples of discounts allowed in jurisdictions with existing fees
are given in Table 2. Several cities also exempt vacant parcels,
city-owned land and public open spaces.
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Table 2: Examples of utility fee discounts.
State City Conditions for Discount
CO Fort Collins Low-income and all elderly residents
OR Ashland Low-income elderly residents
OR Grants Pass Vacant properties unoccupied for 30
days
50% discount for residences with no
vehicles
OR Hubbard Low-income elderly residents
OR North Plains 50% discount for residences with no
vehicles
OR Phoenix Low-income elderly residents
Residences with no vehicles discounted
to senior housing rates
TX Austin Measured traﬃc below assigned level
TX Beaumont Elderly residents
Source:Angelo Planning Group (2008).
4.3 Revenue adequacy and sustainability
Travel patterns, although they may be more dynamic than
property values, do not change drastically, so revenue sources
based on trip generation would be fairly stable. An adequate
level of revenue could be determined by calculation based on
the cost of necessary maintenance or on the existing share of
property tax devoted to transportation uses. Since utility fees
are best suited for funding continued maintenance of existing
facilities, another funding source would be necessary for capi-
tal projects. Itmay be deemedpolitically necessary to limit the
fee to funding only a portion of maintenance expenses, as was
the case in Clackamas County, Oregon (Springer and Ghi-
larducci 2004). Additional đnancing to cover the remaining
costs would then be needed from other sources. Costs derived
from through traﬃcwould also not be covered by the fees, but
this issue may be moot, as most through traﬃc uses arterials
that are funded by higher levels of government. Establishing a
transportation utility fee would provide cities with additional
diversity in revenue sources, serving as a hedge against Ĕuctu-
ating levels generated by other taxes and fees.
4.4 Political and administrative feasibility
As with any adjustment to existing local government đnance
mechanisms, the adoption of a transportation utility fee
would create winners and losers. ăis eﬀect has the potential
to increase opposition to transportation utility fees because
the increased bills would fall on commercial interests, which
are generally fewer in number but more prominent politically
than homeowners. Since the đrst application of transporta-
tionutility fees inmost states has been contested, local oﬃcials
enacting a utility fee for transportation should be prepared to
defend it against a legal challenge. ăe most important char-
acteristic a fee must possess to be upheld is a direct and appar-
ent connection between the costs and beneđts associated with
each aﬀected property.
ăe administrative workloadwould be increased compared
to the status quo because the fee would not replace existing
property tax, which would still be needed to fund other city
expenses. Local oﬃcials would need to become familiar with
methods of calculating trip generation estimates and ensure
that land use classiđcations are updated frequently. If the nec-
essary data are not readily available, compilation could be-
come work-intensive. Assessing a fee monthly may also in-
crease administrative complexity compared to an annual tax.
Increasing the number of property categories in order to
address concerns about the equity of estimation procedures
would also require more administrative eﬀort. Carlson et al.
(2007) suggest some clauses that may be politically necessary
but would increase complication of administration. ăese in-
clude an appeals process, a reduction procedure for properties
such as convenience stores that derive business from “pass-by”
rather than “generated” trips, and a ceiling on the fee for iso-
lated cases that could incur very large bills.
Compliance may be more diﬃcult to enforce than with
conventional funding mechanisms, since road access cannot
be shut oﬀ in the same way that electricity and water service
can. If the fee is collected monthly, one option is to tie the
service to other utilities on the same bill and itemize and pri-
oritize them (Ewing 1993). ăe bill might stipulate that the
transportation portion of the total bill be paid before the wa-
ter bill, so that water service would be the đrst to become
delinquent due to chronic underpayment of the total amount.
However, since water and road services are not directly linked
by their nature, this too may create grounds for legal chal-
lenges.
5 Analysis
Introducing a transportation utility fee to fund projects that
would otherwise be paid for out of the general fund through
property taxes would change the proportional contribution
of each land use. ăis analysis determines fees for each type
of property based on trip generation using the cities of Min-
neapolis, Richđeld and Bloomington, Minnesota to represent
a central city, an inner suburb and an outer suburb, respec-
tively. Fees are also calculated for Hennepin County, where
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the test cities are located. As each of these cities comprises a
diﬀerent mix of development types, the eﬀect of varying the
proportions of each type can be observed. ăe transportation
fundingneeds also vary by city, and this is the largest single fac-
tor determining a suﬃcient fee level. ăe fee levels resulting
from the analysis are compared with the shares of the trans-
portation cost borne under the existing property tax regime.
5.1 Data
Several sets of data from various sources were used to de-
termine the distribution of each type of property in each
city. Parcel data from 2008 and general land use data
from 2005 were obtained from MetroGIS. Business infor-
mation—including type of business, total sales and number
of employees—was taken from đles generated by a previous
project that combined 2005 business listings purchased from
Dun& Bradstreet withMetroGIS parcel data (Horning et al.
2008). ăe total numbers of jobs and households in each city
in 2007 were available from the õuarterly Census of Employ-
ment andWages (QCEW)publishedby theUnitedStatesBu-
reau of Labor Statistics. ăe QCEW data also included cate-
gorized employments, but did not report data that would dis-
close information about a speciđc employer because of a low
number of businesses in a category. For this reason the cate-
gorization from the Dun & Bradstreet data was used.
Trip generation rates were obtained from the Seventh Edi-
tion ofTripGeneration (Institute of Transportation Engineers
2003). ăe independent variable for the rates varies. Rates
by unit were used for residential properties, and rates by em-
ployee were used for commercial, industrial and institutional
properties. Another option for nonresidential properties, seen
more commonly in ordinances and used in a previous analysis
of Minnesota cities (Shands and Transportation Policy Insti-
tute 2004), is to calculate trips based on developed Ĕoor area,
reported in Trip Generation as trips per thousand square feet.
Neither independent variable provides rates that are conclu-
sivelymore accurate than the other. ăe number of employees
was chosen as the basis for nonresidential trips in this analy-
sis only because developed Ĕoor area data are not available for
Hennepin County.
ăe transportation expenditures to be covered by the fee in
each city were obtained from themost recent availablemunic-
ipal budgets. Minneapolis and Richđeld 2009 budgets were
used, and the most recent budget available for Bloomington
was from 2008. ăe line items diﬀer somewhat in each city’s
budget, but all three included đgures for engineering and for
street maintenance and repair. ăe amount listed by Bloom-
ington for maintenance administration was also included, as
was the seven percent portion of theMinneapolis budget item
for traﬃc and parking services that is paid out of the general
fund.
For Hennepin County, the fee was estimated using the
amount budgeted in 2009 for the transportation department.
Line items included were administration, planning, design,
construction, traﬃc and operations. Capital expenditures for
new construction projects are budgeted separately and were
not included. If the county were to adopt a utility fee in addi-
tion to the city fees, the utility feewould replace the portion of
county property tax revenues directed toward transportation,
and properties in the sample cities would be assessed both fees.
5.2 Methodology
ăe number of trips generated on a weekday by each single-
family parcel, each unit in a multi-family complex, each busi-
ness or institution and each acre of parkland were computed
for each city and for the county. ăe total transportation ex-
penditure from each municipal budget was then allocated by
trip. ăe results display the fee charged to each property type
that would be suﬃcient to cover the reported transportation
expenses.
ăe number of single-family residential properties in each
municipalitywas calculated by counting thenumber of parcels
in single-family areas using a Geographic Information System
(GIS). ăe result was subtracted from the total number of
households in themunicipality given by theQCEWdata, and
the diﬀerencewas assumed to represent the number of units in
multi-family developments. ăe generalized land use đle from
MetroGIS distinguishes single-family attached construction
from single-family detached houses. ăis analysis assumes
that typical household behavior is similar in both types of de-
velopment, and this takes precedence over the type of physi-
cal construction. ăerefore, both types of development were
classed as single-family developments for the purpose of as-
signing trips. ăe trip generation rate applied to multi-family
units was the average of the reported rates for apartments and
condominiums.
Distributing trips among the various commercial uses in-
volved a more complicated process. ăe đles created by
Horning et al. (2008) included three levels of categorization
based on the North American Industry Classiđcation System
(NAICS).At the đnest granularity,NAICS codes are six-digit
identiđers of the speciđc nature of businesses. ăe data for
the seven-county metropolitan area included 1027 six-digit
categories. ăe businesses were reclassiđed into 67 speciđc
destination codes, and then into 17 more general categories.
In Trip Generation, business and institutional properties are
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grouped into 98 categories, several of which do not correlate
closely with either the destination codes or the general cate-
gories used in this research. For this analysis, the 17most gen-
eral categories of nonresidential properties fromHorning et al.
(2008) were used, and trip generation rates per employee were
determined from the reported information for the most simi-
lar category or categories in Trip Generation.
ăe property categories and trip generation rates used in
the analysis are presented in Table 3. ăe “Other” category
consists mostly of manufacturing and construction jobs, but
also includes agriculture andmining. Some categories, such as
food and entertainment, encompassed uses with widely vary-
ing trip generation rates. In the case of a land use for which
several of the rates inTripGeneration could be considered rep-
resentative, an average rate was calculated. ăe level of aggre-
gation chosen meant that additional considerations, such as a
fee reduction for pass-by trips, could not be applied reliably,
since some categories included both convenience businesses
that would merit such a reduction and destination businesses
that would not. For instance, grocery stores might merit a re-
duction while sit-down restaurants would not, but both are
included in the “Food” category. Each unit of each use was
counted in mixed-use development areas, but no reduction
was made to account for internalized trips.
Properties dedicated to educational, institutional, civic and
religious uses were included in the Dun & Bradstreet data.
Parks, however, were not included and were accounted for
separately, though they generate only a small proportion of to-
tal trips. ăe acreage of parkland in each city was calculated
from the land use data, and the trip generation rate per acre
for city parks was applied. If parks are owned by the munici-
pality, the cost derived from the trips they generate could be
apportioned among other land uses or transferred from funds
collected for the parks budget from other sources.
ăe proportion of trips in each city generated by each use
was then calculated. ăis proportion of the total transporta-
tion cost was allocated to each land use type, and then divided
by the number of units to calculate the residential fee and by
the number of employees in each category to determine the
nonresidential fee. Fees were calculated under two scenarios.
Fee 1 was determined by assuming a complete reallocation of
transportation funding obligation based on trips generated.
To create a less drastic shiĕ for comparison, Fee 2 retained the
general land use breakdown of the property tax, but reallo-
cated the bills of each category of residential and commercial
development. A combination of the two would be possible
as well, in which the general proportions are set so that the
share of transportation costs paid by commercial properties is
Table 3: Trip generation rates by land use category.
Category Trips Generated Basis
Residential:
Single-family 9.57 Unit
Multi-family* 6.29
Nonresidential:
Shopping 28.84 Employee
Food 87.82
Fitness 45.71
Entertainment* 65.74
Health care 7.75
Post oﬃce 28.32
Bank/Insurance 72.79
Education 15.71
Services 14.34
Transportation 6.99
Wholesale 8.21
Information 48.85
Real estate 22.36
Professional 3.32
Administrative 3.32
Other* 2.13
Recreational:
Parks 1.59 Acre
Note: * = derived from author’s calculations.
Source: Institute of Transportation Engineers (2003).
higher than under the current property tax regime, but not
as high as under Fee 1. All calculations were performed us-
ing annual data, but since a utility fee would likely be charged
monthly, a monthly fee level is reported as well.
ăe total property tax bill for each parcel was included in
the parcel data set. ăe metadata đle provided does not ex-
plain which jurisdictions’ taxes are included, and it is likely
that taxes levied by other bodies such as the county and the
school districts are included in the reported tax. ăis does
not aﬀect the proportional contributions calculated for each
property type because all jurisdictions tax the same value, and
only the relative tax share paid by each category of property
was of interest for this analysis. ăis was used to determine an
annual share of property tax per employee or per unit allocated
to transportation for comparison.
5.3 Results
ăe results of the calculations are presented in the charts be-
low. ăe comparison between the fees calculated by both
methods and the share of transportation cost paid via prop-
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erty tax is displayed in Figure 1 for Minneapolis, Figure 2 for
Richđeld, Figure 3 for Bloomington and Figure 4 for Hen-
nepin County. If Fee 1 were enacted, completely redistribut-
ing transportation costs, most commercial properties would
pay more and all residential properties would pay less. En-
acting Fee 2, redistributing costs among the categories within
each land use type, would produce similar eﬀects to a lesser de-
gree. ăemulti-family contribution would increase relative to
the single-family share, and oﬃces would pay less compared
to retail establishments. ăe diﬀerence in scale between the
three cities is determined by the total transportation funding
need, in proportion to total property value in the city for the
property tax and to the total number of trips generated in the
city for the utility fees.
ăe monthly utility fees proposed under each scenario for
residential properties are presented inTable 4 for each city. As
a point of comparison, the residential fees calculated for the
cities studied by Shands and Transportation Policy Institute
(2004) ranged from $0.92 to $2.33 for single-family homes
and from $0.55 to $1.40 for apartments. ăe diﬀerence in fee
levels from city to city can be attributed to variation in the
amount and distribution of development and in the amount
of funding needed. No data were available for comparison to
per-employee rates, as most jurisdictions using the fees have
based them on developed Ĕoor area for nonresidential prop-
erties.
Adherence to the user-pays principle oĕen comes at a cost
of increased regressivity. Calculations were made in an at-
tempt to quantify the eﬀects of the fees on residential prop-
erty by value. Single-family residential propertieswere divided
into four groups by estimated total value, and the average an-
nual payment toward transportation by a household in each
group was determined for each of the three cities using cur-
rent property taxes. ăis amount was compared to the fee
per unit, which varies only by city irrespective of property
value. Multi-family housing units were not included because
the transportation cost per unit is less certain. ăis is partly
because of data limitations and partly because the incidence
of tax on rental property is not clear.
ăe results are shown in Table 5. ăe magnitude of the re-
gressive eﬀect of the fees can be seen, as the owners of lower-
valued properties see their bills increase and the owners of
more valuable properties contribute less. Under Fee 1, all resi-
dential properties pay less, with the burden being shiĕed onto
commercial properties. Higher property values mean higher
bills currently, so these households see a larger decrease with
the fee. ăe regressive eﬀect is more apparent with Fee 2 be-
cause changes in all residential bills must sum to zero, though
the overall shiĕ is less drastic. Both scenarios give less weight
to property owners’ ability to pay than the property tax, in
exchange for stronger correlation with the amount of trans-
portation network use. However, even property value is not a
great indicator of the ability of an owner to pay, since posses-
sion of valuable land does not necessarily correlate with high
liquid wealth.
ăe connection between the demand placed on transporta-
tion facilities by a property and the share of the facility main-
tenance costs charged to that property can be strengthened
further by accounting for the length of the trips each type of
property generates. In theMinneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan
area, the Metropolitan Council (the regional planning orga-
nization) conducted a travel behavior inventory that included
information about the average distances traveled for diﬀerent
types of trips (Metropolitan Council 2003). ăe categories
used in the inventory were more general than those used in
this analysis, and included separate average lengths for trips
related to work, shopping, school and other purposes. ăe
nonresidential trip generation đgures were then weighted by
length to calculate adjusted fee levels. ăe results are shown as
a comparison of shares of nonresidential trip ends in Table 6.
ăis calculationwas basedon the reported lengths of home-
based trips. Lengths of non-home-based trips were included
in the inventory, but were only divided into work and non-
work trips, categories not speciđc enough to be of use in the
present analysis. Because the data were aggregated at multiple
levels, the estimate of the trip length adjustment is less certain
than the other results of the analysis. Assumptions must be
made in order to assign the land use categories to work, shop-
ping or other trip purposes. If a municipality were to include
such a length adjustment in its fee ordinance, more exact đg-
ures on theproportionof trips attributable to customers versus
employees would likely be needed.
ăe cities considered in the present analysis do include
some properties that generate particularly high proportions of
heavy vehicle traﬃc. Businesses such as warehouses, trucking
companies and construction đrms may be assessed less than
their fair share under either fee scenario. A further equity im-
provement could be made if the weight of the vehicles com-
prising the traﬃc generated were taken into account. Local
traﬃc data that would permit the proportion of truck trips for
each business to be determined were not available, and land
use categorization is an issue here as well. Transportation-
related and wholesale businesses could be assessed a weight-
based surcharge, as could some (but not all) of the businesses
in the “Other” category. A gray area would arise in regard to
retail businesses, especially smaller establishments that receive
Prospects for transportation utility fees 
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Figure 1: Comparison of utility fees with transportation share of property tax in Minneapolis, displayed as annual cost per resi-
dential unit or per employee.
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Figure 2: Comparison of utility fees with transportation share of property tax in Richđeld, displayed as annual cost per residential
unit or per employee.
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Figure 3: Comparison of utility fees with property tax share in Bloomington, displayed as annual cost per residential unit or per
employee.
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Figure 4: Comparison of utility fees with property tax share in Hennepin County, displayed as annual cost per residential unit or
per employee. Note the vertical scale has been reduced by half.
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Table 4: Residential monthly utility fees per unit.
Total Annual Single-family Multi-family
City Funding Need Units Fee 1 Fee 2 Units Fee 1 Fee 2
Minneapolis $51 207 828 93 747 $5.08 $18.67 73 620 $3.34 $12.27
Richđeld $2 333 080 10 450 $3.17 $9.21 4524 $2.08 $6.05
Bloomington $7 950 995 26 301 $2.44 $9.86 10 490 $1.61 $6.48
Hennepin Co. $32 120 312 340 503 $1.11 $4.25 141 762 $0.73 $2.79
Note: Fee 1 is determined by a total reallocation of cost based on trips. Fee 2 is determined
by a partial reallocation.
Source:Author’s calculations.
deliveries by truck only infrequently. Properties located along
bus routes present another complication: businesses whose
trucks use the routes might protest that buses would continue
to cause pavement wear if the trucks were removed, and that
the buses would run even if the businesses’ customers were
to arrive by other modes. Because considering vehicle weight
makes the determination of fees much more complex, it was
not attempted here; governments considering weight-based
surcharges would need to perform an evaluation based on lo-
cal conditions.
6 Conclusion
Transportation utility fees connect the share of infrastruc-
turemaintenance costs paid by property owners to the beneđt
they derive from access to the transportation system. On the
beneđciary-pays principle, this provides an equity improve-
ment over the property tax, which also reĔects value due to
characteristics other than accessibility. However, the legal-
ity of transportation utility fees varies from state to state, and
there is a risk that a fee will be invalidated as an unauthorized
tax. Fee ordinances that have been upheld have limited the use
of the proceeds to transportation purposes, and have tended
to favor maintenance applications over new construction, so
funding from other sources would still be necessary for capital
projects. ăis could be addressed by pairing the utility feewith
another value capture strategy that applies predominantly to
new construction, such as an impact fee.
Compared to conventional property tax funding, trans-
portation utility fees change the proportion of transportation
costs borne by owners of various types of property. Residential
property owners generally pay less, and commercial property
owners generally pay more. Lower-valued residential proper-
ties see larger increases than more valuable property. Reduc-
ing the diﬀerence between the fee level assessed and the por-
tion of property tax currently paid toward transportationmay
render public acceptance of the fee system more likely. One
way to accomplish this would be to leave the general distri-
bution of costs unchanged, and reallocate based on trip gen-
eration only among speciđc categories of property within the
same land use. Further adjustment based on trip length or ve-
hicle weight may also help to address equity concerns.
Changing the structure of local transportation funding by
charging a fee based on land use rather than a tax on valuemay
aﬀect future land use patterns in the city. Businesses that at-
tract large traﬃc volumes may choose to locate in a city with-
out a utility fee, especially in suburban areas where nearby op-
tions are likely to be similar in other respects. Conversely, con-
struction in a city with a utility fee might increase in value if
there is a corresponding property tax reduction. ăis is a ques-
tion that could be investigated empirically in cities where util-
ity fees have been in place for a suﬃcient length of time.
When a utility fee is designed, a balance must be found
between eﬃciency, equity and administrative concerns. ăe
fairest system, in terms of billing based on use, would re-
quire the installation of traﬃc counters at each property to
obtain accurate trip generation rates. Even if this were not
prohibitively expensive, the potential for evasion would re-
main. Establishing more land use categories would enable
rate estimates to be adjusted at a đner level, improving equity
while avoiding the cost of metering traﬃc. An optimal level
of aggregation would weigh the need to produce accurate trip
estimates and to minimize the potential for legal challenges
against the additional administrative eﬀort that a more de-
tailed procedure would require.
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Table 5: Single-family residential cost changes by property value.
City Value
õuartile
Property Tax
Avg. Cost ($)
Utility Fee 1 Utility Fee 2
Avg. Cost ($) Change ($) Change (%) Avg. Cost ($) Change ($) Change (%)
Minneapolis 1 143.34 61.01 −82.33 −57.4 224.09 +80.75 +56.3
2 192.75 61.01 −131.74 −68.4 224.09 +31.34 +16.3
3 247.71 61.01 −186.70 −75.4 224.09 −23.62 −9.5
4 487.64 61.01 −426.63 −87.5 224.09 −263.55 −54.1
Richđeld 1 86.59 38.01 −48.58 −56.1 110.55 +23.96 +27.7
2 101.28 38.01 −63.27 −62.5 110.55 +9.27 +9.2
3 111.38 38.01 −73.37 −65.9 110.55 −0.83 −0.7
4 138.26 38.01 −100.25 −72.5 110.55 −27.71 −20.0
Bloomington 1 67.12 29.33 −37.79 −56.3 118.26 +51.14 +76.2
2 89.53 29.33 −60.20 −67.2 118.26 +28.73 +32.1
3 105.82 29.33 −76.49 −72.3 118.26 +12.44 +11.8
4 173.68 29.33 −144.35 −83.1 118.26 −55.42 −31.9
Hennepin Co. 1 28.67 13.31 −15.36 −53.6 51.00 +22.33 +77.9
2 38.85 13.31 −25.54 −65.7 51.00 +12.15 +31.3
3 49.69 13.31 −36.38 −73.2 51.00 +1.31 +2.6
4 108.39 13.31 −95.08 −87.7 51.00 −57.39 −53.0
Note: Fee 1 is determined by a total reallocation of cost based on trips. Fee 2 is determined by a partial reallocation.
Source:Author’s calculations.
Table 6:Nonresidential trip shares adjusted by average trip length.
Minneapolis Richđeld Bloomington Hennepin Co.
Share
(trips)
Share
(miles)
Change
(%)
Share
(trips)
Share
(miles)
Change
(%)
Share
(trips)
Share
(miles)
Change
(%)
Share
(trips)
Share
(miles)
Change
(%)
Shopping 0.062 0.041 −33.5 0.373 0.326 −12.7 0.143 0.104 −27.4 0.111 0.075 −32.5
Food 0.339 0.226 −33.5 0.380 0.331 −12.7 0.419 0.304 −27.4 0.319 0.216 −32.5
Fitness 0.007 0.004 −33.5 0.010 0.009 −12.7 0.009 0.007 −27.4 0.014 0.009 −32.5
Entertainment 0.030 0.024 −18.5 0.009 0.010 +6.9 0.026 0.023 −11.0 0.025 0.020 −17.3
Health care 0.042 0.034 −18.5 0.033 0.035 +6.9 0.011 0.010 −11.0 0.035 0.029 −17.3
Post oﬃce 0.002 0.001 −18.5 0.006 0.006 +6.9 0.002 0.002 −11.0 0.001 0.001 −17.3
Bank/Insurance 0.232 0.321 +38.7 0.040 0.073 +82.1 0.200 0.303 +51.5 0.243 0.342 +40.9
Education 0.057 0.060 +4.8 0.054 0.074 +37.6 0.012 0.013 +14.4 0.040 0.042 +6.4
Services 0.042 0.034 −18.5 0.045 0.048 +6.9 0.037 0.033 −11.0 0.039 0.032 −17.3
Transportation 0.005 0.006 +38.7 0.001 0.002 +82.1 0.005 0.007 +51.5 0.005 0.006 +40.9
Wholesale 0.013 0.018 +38.7 0.010 0.019 +82.1 0.022 0.033 +51.5 0.021 0.030 +40.9
Information 0.100 0.139 +38.7 0.005 0.010 +82.1 0.045 0.068 +51.5 0.069 0.097 +40.9
Real estate 0.022 0.030 +38.7 0.018 0.033 +82.1 0.025 0.038 +51.5 0.029 0.041 +40.9
Professional 0.019 0.027 +38.7 0.004 0.008 +82.1 0.014 0.021 +51.5 0.016 0.023 +40.9
Administrative 0.016 0.022 +38.7 0.006 0.010 +82.1 0.010 0.015 +51.5 0.013 0.019 +40.9
Other 0.013 0.011 −18.5 0.005 0.005 +6.9 0.020 0.018 −11.0 0.019 0.015 −17.3
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Note:ăe eﬀect of weighting for length varies with the distribution of land uses in each city but is the same for Fee 1 and Fee 2.
Source:Author’s calculations.
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